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The Department of Justice has made it a priority in corporate criminal
investigations to require that companies single out those within the
organization responsible for any wrongdoing. In a memorandum issued in
September 2015, former Deputy Attorney General, Sally Q. Yates, drew a
line in the sand for determining whether a corporation would receive credit
for cooperating in an investigation: "In order for a company to receive any
consideration for cooperation under the Principles of Federal Prosecution of
Business Organizations, the company must completely disclose to the
Department all relevant facts about individual misconduct."' Ms. Yates
defended the policy more recently by asserting that, "[o]ur goal is not to
collect corporate heads."2 But that has to be the hope. Otherwise, society
will view the Department's focus on individual liability as just a publicity
stunt that fails to police organizations for the harms they cause.3
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. The author may be contacted at
peter.henning@wayne.edu.
t My thanks to Will Ortman for his many helpful comments on a draft, and to Jennifer Taub
and the Vermont Law Review editors for their hard work on the Symposium and this essay.
1. Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
the Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitmst Div., the Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Div., the Assistant
Attorney Gen., Criminal Div., the Assistant Attorney Gen., Env't & Nat. Res. Div., the Assistant
Attorney Gen., Nat'l Sec. Div., the Assistant Attorney Gen., Tax Div., the Dir., Fed. Bureau of
Investigation, the Dir., Exec. Office for U.S. Trs., all U.S. Attorneys (Sept. 9, 2015),
https://wwwjustice.gov/dag/file/769036/download.
2. Sally Q. Yates, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Remarks at the New York
City Bar Association White Collar Crime Conference (May 10, 2016),
https://wwwjustice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attomey-general-sally-q-yates-delivers-remarks-new-york-
city-bar-association [hereinafter Yates Address].
3. See Joseph W. Yockey, Beyond Yates: From Engagement to Accountability in Corporate
Crime, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 409, 410 (2016) ("Its guidelines amount to political talking points that are
unlikely to produce meaningful change."); Elizabeth E. Joh & Thomas W. Joo, The Corporation as
Snitch: The New DOJ Guidelines on Prosecuting White Collar Crime, 101 VA. L. REV. 51, 52 (2015)
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Former Attorney General Eric Holder and other federal officials have
long touted how strongly the government cracked down on corporate
misconduct in response to political pressure to act caused by the financial
crisis.4 They extracted settlements from Bank of America for $16.65
billion, Citigroup for $7 billion,' and JPMorgan for $13 billion, related to
the packaging and sale of residential mortgage-backed securities during the
run-up to the financial crisis in 2008. Prosecutors obtained guilty pleas from
the foreign subsidiaries of Rabobank and Royal Bank of Scotland for their
role in manipulating the London Interbank Offered Rate, or Libor.' BNP
Paribas pleaded guilty and paid $8.9 billion for violations of economic
sanctions laws prohibiting transactions on behalf of companies in Sudan,
Iran, and Cuba.9 Perhaps this was done to help overcome Holder's response
at a Senate hearing in 2013 that some banks had become "so large that it
does become difficult for us to prosecute them when we are hit with
("This tough talk about individual corporate agents is probably at least in part a short-term political
move."); Chris Modlish, Note, The Yates Memo: DOJ Public Relations Move or Meaningful Reform
That Will End Impunity for Corporate Criminals?, B.C. L. REV., (forthcoming) ("Although the Yates
Memo's six prosecutorial guidelines are a step in the right direction, many commentators have pointed
out that they are simply a restatement of the DOJ's already longstanding policy of targeting individuals.
Indeed, some have even gone so far as to state that the new rules are merely symbolic public
messaging.") (footnote omitted).
4. See Court E. Golumbic & Albert D. Lichy, The "Too Big to Jail" Effect and the Impact on
the Justice Department's Corporate Charging Policy, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1293, 1315 (2014) ("The
financial crisis of 2008 wreaked havoc on Main Street and Wall Street and was followed by a deep
global economic downturn. In the aftermath of the crisis, the Justice Department came under increasing
political pressure to take tougher measures against financial institutions deemed responsible for
triggering the collapse.") (footnote omitted).
5. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bank of America to Pay $16.65 Billion in Historic
Justice Department Settlement for Financial Fraud Leading up to and During the Financial Crisis (Aug.
21, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bank-america-pay-1665-billion-historic-justice-department-
settlement-financial-fraud-leading.
6. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department, Federal and State Partners Secure
Record $7 Billion Global Settlement with Citigroup for Misleading Investors about Securities
Containing Toxic Mortgages (July 14, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/justice-department-
federal-and-state-partners-secure-record-7-billion-global-settlement.
7. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department, Federal and State Partners Secure
Record $13 Billion Global Settlement with JPMorgan for Misleading Investors about Securities
Containing Toxic Mortgages (Nov. 19, 2013), https://wwwjustice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-
federal-and-state-partners-secure-record-13-billion-global-settlement.
8. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, RBS Securities Japan Limited Agrees to Plead Guilty
in Connection with Long-Running Manipulation of Libor Benchmark Interest Rates (Feb. 6, 2013),
https://wwwjustice.gov/opa/pr/rbs-securities-japan-limited-agrees-plead-guilty-connection-long-
running-manipulation-libor.
9. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, BNP Paribas Agrees to Plead Guilty and to Pay $8.9
Billion for Illegally Processing Financial Transactions for Countries Subject to U.S. Economic
Sanctions (June 30, 2014),https://wwwjustice.gov/opa/pr/bnp-paribas-agrees-plead-guilty-and-pay-89-
billion-illegally-processing-financial.
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indications that if you do prosecute, if you do bring a criminal charge, it
will have a negative impact on the national economy, perhaps even the
world economy."'o
Holder tried to take back that ill-phrased statement, claiming weeks
later that he had been "misconstrued" and that "[b]anks are not too big to
jail."" A few months after that, in announcing the settlement with Bank of
America, Associate Attorney General Tony West said, "[b]y filing this
lawsuit today, we reaffirm an important principle - that everyone must
play by the same set of rules, and no institution is too big or too powerful to
escape appropriate enforcement. "12 But no amount of jawboning could
change the public perception that "too big to jail" had taken hold of federal
prosecutors.'3 As Professor Brandon Garrett pointed out, "[t]hese billions of
dollars in fines imposed in recent years are not all that they appear. The
staggering fines . . . are dominated by a handful of blockbuster cases, and
should not suggest that federal prosecutors have necessarily become more
aggressive across the board." 4
Even as the drumbeat of large settlements marched on, the ground
shifted to a new critique of the Department of Justice's response to the
financial crisis. Corporate fines and disgorgement, along with purported
relief to distressed borrowers, was no longer good enough. As Federal
District Judge Jed S. Rakoff pointed out, "[I]f . .. the Great Recession was
in material part the product of intentional fraud, the failure to prosecute
those responsible must be judged one of the more egregious failures of the
criminal justice system in many years."'5 The corporate punishments were
akin to paying a parking ticket-albeit a sizeable one-with no one inside
the company held accountable for wrongdoing perpetrated through the
organization. There were crimes, so the Department led us to believe, but
10. Jonathan Well, There Is Still Such a Thing as 'Too Big to Jail', BLOOMBERG (May 6,
2014), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2014-05-06/there-is-still-such-a-thing-as-too-big-to-
jail.
11. Oversight of the U.S. Dep't of Justice: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. H
ofReps., 113th Cong. 15 (2013) (statement of Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice),
https://judiciary.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/113-43-80973-1.pdf [hereinafter House
Judiciary Committee Hearing].
12. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Department of Justice Sues Bank of America for
Defrauding Investors in Connection with Sale of Over $850 Million of Residential Mortgage-Backed
Securities (Aug. 6, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-sues-bank-america-
defrauding-investors-connection-sale-over-850-million.
13. See BRANDON L. GARRETT, Too BIG TO JAIL: How PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH
CORPORATIONS 83-84 (2014) (discussing that often the corporations, not individuals, were held liable).
14. Brandon L. Garrett, The Rise ofBank Prosecutions, 126 YALE L.J.F. 33, 39 (2016).
15. Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been




apparently no one to point the finger at except the corporate logo.' 6
Whether there was in fact widespread criminality is an open question, but
when it comes to public opinion about responsibility for the financial crisis,
facts do not often seem to matter.'7
Does the shift to emphasizing individual culpability mean there will be
an upsurge of prosecutions of corporate executives who oversee companies
that engage in misconduct? The short answer is no. One reason is that the
new-or perhaps renewed-emphasis on pursuing individuals is not a real
change in the Department of Justice's policy." Prosecuting individuals has
always been a priority, from the insider trading prosecutions in the 1980s of
Ivan Boesky and Michael Milken,1 9 to the Savings and Loan Crisis in the
early 1990s,2 0 to the accounting scandals that brought down companies like
Enron and WorldCom in the early 2000s.2 1 The companies were far less
important than going after individuals, especially since the leader's
misconduct is what wiped out the enterprise.
Why the need for the Deputy Attorney General to defend the policy by
proclaiming that federal prosecutors are not looking for "corporate heads,"
when that appears to be its express purpose? Perhaps this is a means to set
the groundwork for a handy excuse: to explain why companies might
continue to receive the typical deferred (or non-prosecution) agreements to
settle cases even though there are few individual prosecutions, and none
involving senior executives. The oft-repeated insistence that pursuing cases
against individuals is difficult because of the heightened intent
16. See Yockey, supra note 3, at 411 ("When a frustrated and financially hard-hit public sees a
dearth of individual prosecutions following bank collapses and widespread evidence of predatory
lending, it is only natural for questions to arise about the efficacy of federal enforcement.").
17. See Daniel C. Richman, Corporate Headhunting, 8 HARV. L & POL'Y REv. 265, 268
(2014) ("Once we put bad analogies aside and squarely try to figure out whether widespread criminal
misconduct drove-or was even associated with-the financial crisis, we face one of the classic
accountability problems in federal criminal law: since a financial collapse is not itself evidence of
criminal conduct, and white-collar criminal activity is rarely revealed with any clarity except by those
responsible for prosecuting crimes, how does one assess the adequacy of those prosecutorial efforts?")
(footnote omitted).
18. See Yockey, supra note 3, at 413 ("Overall, though, the memo represents little more than a
written restatement of how the game has always been played. DOJ officials spanning both the Bush and
Obama administrations stressed and continue to stress the importance of aggressively pursuing
individuals in cases of corporate crime.").
19. Kurt Eichenwald, Milken Set to Pay a $600 Million Fine in Wall St. Fraud, N.Y TIMES
(Apr. 21, 1990), http://www.nytimes.com/1990/04/21/business/milken-set-to-pay-a-600-million-fine-in-
wall-st-fraud.html?pagewanted-all.
20. Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Crime, Justice, and the Savings and Loan Crisis,
18 CRIME & JUST. 247, 247 (1993).
21. Suzanne Barlyn, U.S. Judge Closes SEC's Case Against Ex-Enron ChiefSkilling, REUTERS
(Dec. 8, 2015, 4:04 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-sec-enron-skilling-
idUSKBNOTR2OP20151208.
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requirements in many white-collar offenses reinforces this explanation.
This heightened intent helps to forestall criticism of the absence of
prosecutions of high-level corporate officials. Yates noted in her recent
speech: "Blurred lines of authority make it hard to identify who is
responsible for individual business decisions and it can be difficult to
determine whether high-ranking executives, who appear to be removed
from day-to-day operations, were part of a particular scheme."22 In other
words, do not blame us, it is the fault of these complex organizations.
So despite the hope of generating more individual prosecutions, the
Department of Justice seems to be hedging its bets at the outset-and for
good reason. What is becoming increasingly apparent is that prosecuting
cases against corporate employees and executives, which has never been
easy, is getting harder. Nor is the Justice Department's recent track record
for pursuing individuals for corporate wrongdoing a harbinger of great
success.
The Gulf of Mexico oil spill in 2010 led Attorney General Holder to
proclaim that, "we must also ensure that anyone found responsible for this
spill is held accountable. That means enforcing the appropriate civil - and
if warranted, criminal - authorities to the full extent of the law." 23 Four
years later, the tally from the prosecutions of five BP Inc. employees-none
a senior executive-was 23 counts withdrawn before trial, 23 more counts
dismissed by judges, three guilty pleas to misdemeanors, and two
acquittals.24 This track record does not inspire much confidence that
prosecutors will be any more successful in pursuing individuals when there
is serious corporate misconduct.25
Companies have adopted increasingly extensive compliance programs
in response to pressure from the government to show their adherence to the
law and willingness to prevent violations. Those efforts can also give
management a basis to claim that they were unaware of any wrongdoing, or
at least sought outside guidance before mbarking on a course of conduct-
evidence that can help establish their good faith. The Fraud Section in the
22. Yates Address, supra note 2.
23. Eric Holder, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Address in New Orleans on the Gulf Oil
Spill (June 1, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-gulf-oil-spill.
24. See Aruna Viswanatha, U.S. Bid to Prosecute BP Staff in Gulf Oil Spill Falls Flat, WALL
ST. JOURNAL, http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-bid-to-prosecute-bp-staff-in-gulf-oil-spill-falls-flat-
1456532116 (last updated Feb. 27, 2016) (discussing the results of the government's prosecution of BP
staff involved in the Gulf oil spill).
25. See Yockey, supra note 3, at 415 ("Federal prosecutors understand that managers often
play pivotal roles in creating the conditions that can lead to corporate malfeasance, and they know that
the surest way to improve their professional prospects is to convict managers who are caught
committing criminal wrongs. They just have a hard time making much headway given the cards they
have been dealt.").
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Department of Justice's Criminal Division, which is responsible for a
number of corporate prosecutions, even hired a compliance "guru" to
advise the Department on how well a company is working to prevent and
detect violations.26 For cases under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, there
is a one-year pilot program to offer an extra benefit to companies that self-
report and fully cooperate, including a 50% discount on any recommended
fine-almost like a "Black Friday" or "Cyber Monday" sale.27 So pursuing
cases against individuals, especially executives, will not be any easier as
corporations become savvier at playing the cooperation game.
As companies get larger, there is a shrinking chance someone from the
C-suite will have had any actual involvement in day-to-day decisions that
provide the fodder for an individual prosecution. It appears that mid-level
managers will have to bear the brunt of the focus on individual liability for
corporate misconduct.28 For example, the investigation of Volkswagen for
installing a "defeat device" in a number of its diesel vehicles to pass strict
environmental tests was clearly the work of numerous individuals inside the
company.2 9 Yet, to date, only one engineer has pleaded guilty, and he was
well down the ladder from the senior levels of company management.3 0 The
company pleaded guilty in January and agreed to pay $4.3 billion to settle
criminal and civil charges, and six mid-level executives were charged with
26. According to a press release issued in November 2015, the hiring of Hui Chen as an
adviser to the head of the Fraud Section heralded a new approach to evaluating corporate compliance:
Chen will provide expert guidance to Fraud Section prosecutors as they consider the enumerated factors
in the United States Attorneys' Manual concerning the prosecution of business entities, including the
existence and effectiveness of any compliance program that a company had in place at the time of the
conduct giving rise to the prospect of criminal charges, and whether the corporation has taken
meaningful remedial action, such as the implementation of new compliance measures to detect and
prevent future wrongdoing. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, New Compliance Counsel Expert
Retained by the DOJ Fraud Section (Nov. 2, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-
fraud/file/790236/download.
27. Memorandum from Andrew Weissmann, Chief, Fraud Section, Criminal Div., U.S. Dep't
of Justice, to Fraud Section, Criminal Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice (Apr. 5, 2016),
https://wwwjustice.gov/opa/file/838386/download. Like any program that seeks cooperation,
prosecutors are unlikely to announce that it was a failure. So we should expect the one-year program to
become a permanent feature of FCPA cases.
28. See Brandon L. Garrett, The Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, 101 VA. L. REV. 1789,
1791 (2015) ("Most prosecuted individuals were not high-up officers of the companies, but rather
middle managers of one kind or another."); Yockey, supra note 3, at 416 ("At the threshold, with high-
level managers likely to remain insulated from indictment-inducing activities, lower-level employees
must now be favorites to emerge as the most frequent targets under the Yates protocol.").
29. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Volkswagen Engineer Pleads Guilty for His Role in
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helping to cover up the environmental violations.3' But only one of those
executives is in federal custody after being arrested in Miami, while the
others are safely out of reach in Germany, which does not extradite its
citizens.32 Although Volkswagen's former chief executive, Martin
Winterkorn, has been identified as a suspect by German prosecutors,
whether charges against senior management will ever be brought-
especially in the United States-remains an open question.3 3
Nor is it just a matter of how difficult it can be to prove an executive
committed a crime. The courts are attuned in this context, unlike more
mundane prosecutions that involve obvious misconduct, to arguments that
statutes are being applied too aggressively by prosecutors trying to make
ordinary actions into something criminal-a claim that few drug dealers or
gang members could ever advance with a straight face.
I offer below some thoughts about why it is becoming more difficult to
pursue charges against individuals involved in corporate misconduct,
especially those in the executive suite. I make no claim to any unified
theory about the future of white-collar prosecutions, nor do I propose any
solutions, if there are any to be had. Instead, these are developments to
watch that may help explain why prosecutions of senior managers are
becoming a relic.
31. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Volkswagen AG Agrees to Plead Guilty and Pay $4.3
Billion in Criminal and Civil Penalties and Six Volkswagen Executives and Employees Are Indicted in
Connection with Conspiracy to Cheat U.S. Emissions Tests (Jan. 11, 2017),
https://wwwjustice.gov/usao-edmi/pr/volkswagen-ag-agrees-plead-guilty-and-pay-43-billion-criminal-
and-civil-penalties-and.
32. See Peter J. Henning, U.S. Crackdown on Corporate Wrongdoers May Be Undone by
National Borders, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Jan. 16, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/16/business/dealbook/us-crackdown-on-corporate-wrongdoers-may-
be-undone-by-national-borders.html?_r=O ("The arrest of Mr. Schmidt highlights the problem the
Justice Department faces in pursuing charges against the other five defendants. All are believed to be in
Germany, and as long as they stay there they can avoid the fate of their co-worker.").
33. See Jack Ewing, Offices of Volkswagen and Audi Chiefs Searched in Raid, Warrant Says,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/19/business/volkswagen-chief-
executive-emissions-warrant.html (discussing a German search warrant and subsequent raid of
Volkswagen executive offices in Germany). "[T]he warrant, signed by a judge in Munich, allowed
investigators to seize documents and other items such as appointment calendars, copies of emails,
mobile phones and electronic passwords from Mr. Mflller [current chief executive of Volkswagen] and
Mr. Stadler [head of the Audi division], and numerous other current or past Volkswagen and Audi
employees." Id. The German warrant further stated that, "investigators are still trying to determine who
'took initiative for this development, which levels of company hierarchy were informed, and what level
made the decision to mass produce the defeat device."' Id.
2017] 509
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I. IT ONLY LOOKS LIKE FRAUD
Early in the movie The Blues Brothers, Elwood Blues (Dan Aykroyd)
tells his brother Jake (John Belushi), recently released from prison, that it
will not be easy to put their eponymous band back together because its
members have gone in different directions. Jake berates his brother for not
telling the truth about the status of the band while he was behind bars:
Jake: You were outside, I was inside, you were s'posed to keep in
touch with the band. I kept asking you if we were gonna play
again.
Elwood: Well, what was I gonna do? Take away you're [sic] only
hope? Take away the very thing that kept you going in there? I
took the liberty of bull[********] you, okay?
Jake: You lied to me.
Elwood: It wasn't lies, it was just bull[****]. 34
It seems that some federal appeals courts have taken to heart Elwood's
explanation of his dissembling to limit the scope of fraud laws.
In United States v. Weimert,35 the Seventh Circuit overturned the
conviction of a former bank officer who led the sale of its interest in a
property development in Texas shortly after the financial crisis when it was
desperate to raise capital.36 David Weimert obtained two offers for the
property, both of which exceeded the bank's target price.37 It turns out that
he told the winning bidders that his employer, AnchorBank, required that
he participate in negotiations as one of the investors to approve the deal.38
In turn, he told the bank that the buyers insisted that he be a minority
partner in the transaction.39 The $7.8 million sale helped the bank meet
certain capital requirements from its bailout during the financial crisis.40
Everyone should have been happy-except that a subsequent SEC
investigation of the transaction resulted in Weimert spilling the beans about
34. THE BLUES BROTHERS (Universal Pictures 1980),
http://www.sellingyourscreenplay.com/wp-content/uploads/screenplay/scripts/The-Blues-Brothers.pdf
35. United States v. Weimert, 819 F.3d 351 (7th Cir. 2016).
36. Id. at 353-54.
37. Id.
38. Id at 361.
39. Id
40. Id at 363.
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his misstatements to the two sides in the deal.4' Subsequently indicted, a
jury convicted Weimert of five counts of wire fraud, and sentenced him to
18 months in prison, well below the recommended sentencing range of 87
to 108 months.42
The Seventh Circuit reversed the conviction, finding that any
misstatement to the buyer "would not have been material because it was
deception of the opposing party in a transaction about the negotiating
positions of third parties."4 3 When two sides are trying to reach an
agreement, "Congress could not have meant to criminalize deceptive
misstatements or omissions about a buyer's or seller's negotiating
positions."44 Does that mean it is permissible to lie? Not about everything,
since factual representations could be the basis for a fraud prosecution. But
Weimert's lies were just about a condition for reaching a deal, and so
"negotiating parties, and certainly the sophisticated businessmen in this
case, do not expect complete candor about negotiating positions, as distinct
from facts and promises of future behavior."4 5 Thus, "[d]eception about
negotiating positions-about reserve prices and other terms and their
relative importance-should not be considered material for purposes of
mail and wire fraud statutes."46 The Seventh Circuit refused to find any
fraud based on the fiduciary duty Weimert owed to AnchorBank as an
employee and officer. The court pointed out that the Supreme Court in
Skilling v. United States confined the honest services theory of fraud to
bribes and kickbacks.47
How appropriate that the appeals court sits in Chicago, the site of much
of The Blues Brothers, because apparently, in negotiations, a party is free to
take Elwood's view of lying in its dealings with the other party. The
Seventh Circuit described the case as an "unusual, and seemingly
unprecedented, prosecution" because "[t]he final contract terms were in
plain view and were in fact discussed and negotiated by the interested
41. Id. ("In April 2012, Weimert gave testimony before the SEC regarding the deal. He
testified that the Burkes had not insisted on his involvement, but that instead he had told the Burkes he
would 'like to be part of the transaction.' Weimert said he had felt he 'was the broker in the transaction
and deserved a piece of the transaction.' Weimert further testified that he was 'an earmark to the deal,' a
description he claims he used to alert the IDI board that he 'wanted to make sure that they understood
that I wasn't absolutely necessary for this deal.' All IDI directors testified at Weimert's trial, though,
that Weimert had not described his role as an 'earmark' but had told them instead that his participation
was required by the Burkes.").
42. Id. at 364.
43. Id. at 365, 370.
44. Id. at 357 (citations omitted).
45. Id. at 358.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 354 (citing Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010)).
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parties. We leave the civil law issues and remedies for civil cases."48 The
terms were there, and AnchorBank got a better deal than it might have
otherwise, so perhaps the circuit court was taking a "no harm, no foul"
approach. But, mail and wire fraud are not dependent on the victims
actually losing money, so long as there is a fraudulent scheme designed to
deprive that person of something of value.4 9 It is unclear how much of a
stretch it was to prosecute a corporate official for lying to both sides in a
deal so that he could cut himself in on a part of it. Yet, after the Supreme
Court's narrow reading of the honest services provision in Skilling, it turns
out that mere conflicts of interest are not subject to prosecution, even if
designed to enrich the person who was dishonest.
The Second Circuit has also found that lies in the context of business
relationships may not be enough to support a fraud charge. In United States
v. Litvak,o the circuit court overturned the securities fraud conviction of a
former bond salesman at Jeffries & Co., Jesse Litvak, who misled
purchasers about the cost at which his firm acquired the securities it sold to
them.5 ' These were residential mortgage-backed securities sold to
sophisticated investors, and a spreadsheet containing the actual prices was
accidently sent to a buyer.52 "Those he dealt with were unaware that he was
taking a larger cut on behalf of Jefferies than he had represented to them.
Without knowledge of Litvak's actions, the financial consequences of
negotiations colored by false representations were virtually undiscoverable
in the opaque RMBS market."5 3
Unable to deny that Litvak lied to his clients, the defense sought to
introduce expert testimony that buyers conducted their own analysis of the
value of the bonds, which made the defendant's misstatements about their
cost immaterial.54 The trial court excluded it, but the Second Circuit agreed
the evidence should have been admitted, finding that
a jury could reasonably have found that misrepresentations by a
dealer as to the price paid for certain RMBS would be immaterial
to a counterparty that relies not on a "market" price or the price at
48. Id. at 370.
49. See United States v. Takhalov, 827 F.3d. 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2016) ("For § 1343 forbids
only schemes to defraud, not schemes to do other wicked things, e.g., schemes to lie, trick, or otherwise
deceive. The difference, of course, is that deceiving does not always involve harming another person;
defrauding does.").
50. United States v. Litvak, 808 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2015).
51. Id. at 177.
52. Id. at 177, 190.
53. Id. at 177.
54. Id. at 180.
512 [Vol. 41:503
Prosecuting Executives for Corporate Misconduct
which prior trades took place, but instead on its own
sophisticated valuation methods and computer model. The full
context and circumstances in which RMBS are traded were
undoubtedly relevant to the jury's determination of materiality.
In other words, Litvak may have lied, but the clients did not really care
about what his firm paid so there was no fraud. Rather than dismiss the
charges, the Second Circuit remanded the case for retrial so that the
government could get another shot a a conviction.6
In another decision reading the scope of the law of fraud narrowly, the
Second Circuit in United States ex rel. O'Donnell v. Countrywide Home
Loans, Inc.5 7 incorporated the common law doctrine that breach of a
contractual promise was insufficient to prove fraudulent intent under the
mail and wire fraud statutes.5 8 The Department of Justice filed a civil
lawsuit against Countrywide Home Loans, at one time the nation's largest
mortgage lender that Bank of America acquired when the housing market
started to collapse in 2008.59 The Department pursued the case under a
provision of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement
Act ("FIRREA"). This provision allows the government to seek penalties
for conduct that violates the fraud statutes so long as it affects "a federally
insured financial institution."'o Congress passed FIRREA during the
Savings and Loan Crisis, and the government largely overlooked the law
until around 2012 when the Department of Justice saw it as a means to go
after banks for their role in issuing (and securitizing) questionable subprime
mortgages.
The complaint alleged that Countrywide agreed to sell mortgages to
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac where borrowers met certain financial
criteria, but actually sold mortgages that fell well short of the
requirements-resulting in substantial losses when the housing market
collapsed in 2008.6 The lie was in creating a program to speed up the
mortgage approval process that resulted in pawning off mortgages that
Countrywide knew fell short of the lending standards it agreed to abide by.
Judge Rakoff, who presided over the trial, said that the program "was from
start to finish the vehicle for a brazen fraud by the defendants, driven by a
55. Id. at 183.
56. Id. at 190.
57. U.S. ex rel. O'Donnell v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 822 F.3d 650 (2d Cir. 2016).
58. Id. at 653.
59. Id. at 652.
60. Id. at 653 (quoting the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of
1989, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1833a(a), (c)(2) (2012)).
61. Id at 654.
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hunger for profits and oblivious to the harms thereby visited, not just on the
immediate victims but also on the financial system as a whole."62
The Second Circuit overturned the verdict, relying on the doctrine that
"the common law requires proof-other than the fact of breach-that, at the
time a contractual promise was made, the promisor had no intent ever to
perform the obligation. "63 So while Countrywide knew it was selling loans
that it should not have made under the program, it did not lie at the time it
entered the contracts with Fannie and Freddie because there was no
evidence to show its intent. In other words, there was no affirmative
misstatement when it sold the mortgages to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,
even though the mortgage company took advantage of a lack of vigilance
on the part of its counterparty. That did not constitute fraud because it
"requires proof of deception, which is absent from ordinary breach of
contract."6 4 The circuit court concluded, therefore, that
[t]he Government did not prove-in fact, did not attempt to
prove-that at the time the contracts were executed
Countrywide never intended to perform its promise of
investment quality. Nor did it prove that Countrywide
made any later misrepresentations-i.e., ones not contained
in the contracts-as to which fraudulent intent could be
found. 65
Did the Second Circuit fall for a nice trick by Countrywide's lawyers-
confused by the oft-referenced contractual doctrine of an "efficient breach,"
turning it into a defense to a fraud charge? Professor Garrett said that "[i]f
so, the Second Circuit swallowed it hook, line, and sinker."66
Countrywide's case was hardly an ordinary efficient breach, in that
Countrywide did not redirect resources to a higher good. Instead, it took
advantage of its own prior statement that it would adhere to specified
standards for approving borrowers, and then sold defective products to
62. U.S. ex rel. O'Donnell v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 3d 494, 503
(S.D.N.Y. 2014), rev'd, 822 F.3d 650 (2d Cir. 2016).
63. O'Donnell, 822 F.3d at 660.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 663.
66. Brandon L. Garrett, Bad Hustle, COLUMBIA LAW SCH.: THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (June
13, 2016), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2016/06/13/bad-hustle/. It is interesting to consider
whether Bank of America would have quickly settled a threatened criminal case charging violations of
the mail and wire fraud statutes rather than a civil case, much as it did with regard to other conduct
during the years before the financial crisis. Why did the Department of Justice use FIRREA rather than
the underlying criminal statutes? Was it perhaps out of fear that the conduct was unethical, but perhaps
not sufficiently criminal?
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Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Countrywide displayed mendacious
conduct-far worse than the actions of a party simply making an economic
decision that will not cause significant harm that it can rectify by paying the
appropriate damages. Professor Garrett asked, "[W]ho would want to sign a
'master' contract that might later expose a person to outright deceit?"67 In
light of Weimert, a party may want to be especially careful about
negotiating that contract, too.
The courts have thrown obstacles in the way of pursuing fraud cases,
and then there is the question of whether a jury will convict corporate
executives for business practices that tread close to the line, but may not
clearly cross over it. A jury in Boston acquitted the former chief executive
and the vice president of sales for a medical device company on conspiracy
and wire fraud charges related to promotion of a product for an unapproved
use. ' The government's fraud theory was that they tried to increase sales
through off-label marketing of a device to deliver steroid medications to
sinuses to make the company a more attractive takeover candidate, but the
jury rejected those counts.69 The jury convicted two defendants of ten
misdemeanor counts of violating the Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act, but
those charges did not require proof of any intent to violate the law,
permitting a conviction based on strict liability.70
Fraud cases are not the only place where the courts take a narrow-one
might even say crabbed-view of what constitutes a crime. In McDonnell v.
United States,' the corruption prosecution of the former governor of
Virginia, the Supreme Court read the "official act" element of the bribery
offense so that "[s]etting up a meeting, talking to another official, or
organizing an event (or agreeing to do so)-without more-does not fit"
within that requirement.72 Chief Justice Roberts's opinion for a unanimous
Court asserted that, "[t]here is no doubt that this case is distasteful; it may
be worse than that. But our concern is not with tawdry tales of Ferraris,
Rolexes, and ball gowns. It is instead with the broader legal implications of
the Government's boundless interpretation of the federal bribery statute."73
67. Id.
68. Brendan Pierson, J&J Unit's Former Execs Convicted of Unapproved Marketing,
REUTERS (July 20, 2016, 6:48 PM) http://www.reuters.com/article/usa-acclarent-fraud-
idUSL1N1A61UH.
69. See id. (discussing the acquittal of two former Acclarent Inc. executives for fraudulent
promotion of a medical device).
70. Id.
71. McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016).
72. Id. at 2372.
73. Id. at 2375.
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But McDonnell was much more than a "tawdry tale" as it involved a
panoply of gifts showered on the governor and his family to buy access and
favor from him-all of which he happily accepted while helping champion
the products of his benefactor.74 The opinion seems to ignore the fact that
much of what elected officials do involves meetings, talking with
constituents and government employees, and attending events. Yet, that
alone is no longer enough to prove corruption because there must be
"something more" that relates to an actual exercise of authority.
In McDonnell, the Court showed its willingness to curtail the use of an
obstruction of justice statute to keep prosecutors from moving too
aggressively to pursue cases that it believed were beyond what Congress
must have meant in enacting the law. Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 1519 as
part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to permit prosecutors to pursue obstruction
charges when material was destroyed before the government started its
investigation. The law provided for up to 20 years in prison for anyone who
"knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or
makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the
intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper
administration of any matter .... "6
In Yates v. United States,77 the Court overturned the conviction of a
defendant who destroyed undersized red groupers, discovered on his fishing
boat, which the government ordered him to preserve until the boat returned
to port.7' The government argued that "tangible object" covered the
groupers, which clearly fall within the dictionary definition of that term.79 A
plurality opinion by Justice Ginsberg, however, rejected such an
"unrestrained reading," finding that the term "is better read to cover only
objects one can use to record or preserve information, not all objects in the
physical world."so Justice Alito, in a concurring opinion, also found the
statute's terminology and title indicated that it was limited to just
recordkeeping, pointing out, "How does one make a false entry in a fish?"'
The majority got the result it wanted, drawing fire from Justice Kagan in a
74. Id.
75. Id. at 2370.
76. Destruction, Alteration, or Falsification of Records in Federal Investigations and
Bankruptcy, 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2012).
77. Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015).
78. Id. at 1078, 1088-89.
79. Id. at 1081.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1090 (Alito, J., concurring).
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dissenting opinion that points to an obvious flaw in the narrow reading of
§ 1519: "A 'tangible object' is an object that's tangible."82
It is difficult to assail the approach of prosecutors in Yates, who
adopted a plausible, common sense reading of the statutory term in a case in
which the defendant destroyed evidence of wrongdoing. If that is too
aggressive, then perhaps the fault lies with Congress, not the prosecutors.
Justice Kagan pointed out "that § 1519 is a bad law-too broad and
undifferentiated, with too-high maximum penalties, which give prosecutors
too much leverage and sentencers too much discretion."83 Going a step
further, she noted the statute was "unfortunately not an outlier, but an
emblem of a deeper pathology in the federal criminal code."84 The
overcriminalization critique is a worthy one, but is not a valid reason to
effectively rewrite a statute under the guise of discerning what Congress
really meant to prohibit. The effect is to give defendants a basis to
challenge other statutes. Defendants can now point to the purported
pernicious effect of prosecutorial aggressiveness as a basis to cut back on
how courts apply these laws to white-collar crimes-at a time when these
statutes are already frequently assailed for their use of broad terms.
There is now plenty of room for crafty, well-advised executives to push
hard for profits and the personal gain that comes from corporate success,
while crafting a plausible argument that they may have come close-but
never actually crossed-the line into fraud or corruption. The courts of late
have effectively diminished the possibility of proving a violation by an
individual within an organization. Courts have done so by allowing at least
a measure of lies, "tawdry tales," and complaints about broadly worded
statutes to take conduct outside criminal prohibitions. So perhaps Elwood
Blues was right, that it is all right just to take the liberty of . .. well, you
know. 5
II. EVEN IF YOU PROVE A CRIME, THERE MAY NOT BE MUCH PUNISHMENT
In the current environment, it is difficult to show that the relatively
few prosecutions of corporate executives have much of a deterrent effect.8 6
82. Id. at 1091 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 1101.
84. Id. at 1101.
85. THE BLUEs BROTHERS, supra note 34.
86. See Richman, supra note 17, at 276 ("Unless we are careful-or are ready for a more
sustained commitment of resources-the message of a relative handful of prosecutions will be 'a few
heads will roll when the market takes a deep dive and the public seeks retribution.' And the target
deterrence audience will weigh the slim chance that lightning will strike them against the enormous
financial gains from continued play."). The most effective deterrent o criminal conduct is the certainty
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Even proving a violation by a corporate executive will be difficult, as the
Department of Justice readily concedes. One way to diminish the problem
of establishing a defendant's intent is to lower the threshold for proving that
element of the offense. That approach has been controversial, too, and there
is a push in Congress to raise the intent level for offenses rather than
making it easier to prove a crime.
The food and drug safety laws, along with some environmental
statutes, allow for prosecution of officials under the "responsible corporate
officer" doctrine." This doctrine makes an individual's supervisorial
authority and the consequent failure to prevent a violation sufficient to
support a criminal conviction." In United States v. Park, the Supreme
Court upheld the conviction of the president of a supermarket chain for
unsanitary conditions that violated the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. The
Court held that the statute "imposes not only a positive duty to seek out and
remedy violations when they occur but also, and primarily, a duty to
implement measures that will [ensure] that violations will not occur."89
In United States v. DeCoster,90 the Eighth Circuit in a 2-1 decision
upheld the convictions and sentences of a father and son who were
executives in a family-owned chicken farming business for violations of the
same law at issue in Park.9' They were convicted as the responsible
corporate officers for a number of food safety violations that helped trigger
a massive salmonella outbreak in 2010.92 The district judge sentenced them
of detection and punishment, while the actual term of imprisonment is much less relevant. But, if there
is little risk of punishment, then it is unlikely that there will be any real deterrence of white-collar crimes
with the Yates Memo. See Peter J. Henning, Is Deterrence Relevant in Sentencing White-Collar
Criminals?, 61 WAYNE L. REv. 27, 41 (2015) ("Studies have shown that certainty of punishment is the
principle factor in assessing the success of a deterrent, so that increased spending on detection will have
more of an appreciable impact on the crime rate than increasing the level of punishment imposed on
those convicted of a violation.").
87. Randy J. Sutton, "Responsible Corporate Officer" Doctrine or "Responsible Relationship"
of Corporate Officer to Corporate Violation ofLaw, 119 A.L.R. 5th 205 § 2 (2004).
88. Id.
89. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 672 (1975).
90. United States v. DeCoster, 828 F.3d 626 (8th Cir. 2016).
91. Id. at 636.
92. The circuit court summarized the information generated in the criminal investigation after
the salmonella outbreak:
The investigation revealed that Quality Egg previously had falsified records about
food safety measures and had lied to auditors for several years about pest control
measures and sanitation practices. Although its food safety plan stated that
Quality Egg performed flock testing to identify and control salmonella, no flock
testing was ever done. Quality Egg employees had also bribed a USDA inspector
in 2010 to release eggs for sale which had been retained or "red tagged" for
failing to meet minimum quality grade standards. Quality Egg also misled state
regulators and retail customers by changing the packing dates of its eggs and
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to three months each in prison, but on appeal, they argued that the
punishment was a violation of due process and the Eighth Amendment
because the government did not have to prove any mens rea for a
conviction.93 The Eighth Circuit rejected those arguments, holding that,
"[t]he elimination of a mens rea requirement does not violate the Due
Process Clause for a public welfare offense where the penalty is 'relatively
small,' the conviction does not gravely damage the defendant's reputation,
and congressional intent supports the imposition of the penalty."94
Rejecting the Eighth Amendment argument, the circuit court found that the
sentences were "not grossly disproportionate to the gravity of their
misdemeanor offenses," pointing out that the salmonella outbreak traceable
to their business may have affected upwards of 56,000 victims, some of
whom were hospitalized or suffered long-term injuries.95
The dissenting opinion by Circuit Judge Beam argued for proof of
negligence as the prerequisite for imposing a jail sentence for a violation.
Judge Beam argued, "[T]here is no precedent that supports imprisonment
without establishing some measure of a guilty mind on the part of these two
individuals, and none is established in this case."96 He was not alone in
assailing the sentences imposed on corporate executives under the
"responsible corporate officer" doctrine. The Washington Legal
Foundation, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the National Association
of Manufacturers ("NAM") all argued that a conviction and prison sentence
for a strict liability offense based on the person's status within an
organization violates due process.97 NAM's brief, which the libertarian
Cato Institute joined, put it succinctly: "The notion that any executive can
be sent to prison because a subordinate committed a criminal a regulatory
selling the misbranded eggs into interstate commerce. The parties additionally
stipulated that one Quality Egg employee was prepared to testify at trial that Jack
DeCoster had once reprimanded him because he had not moved a pallet of eggs in
time to avoid inspection by the USDA. The investigation also revealed that in
2008 Peter DeCoster had made inaccurate statements to Walmart about Quality
Egg's food safety and sanitation practices.
Id. at 631.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 633.
95. Id at 635.
96. Id. at 642 (Beam, J., dissenting).
97. Br. for Amici Curiae, The National Association of Manufacturers and the CATO Institute
Supporting Appellants and Reversal at 1, United States v. Decoster, 828 F.3d 626 (8th Cir. 2016) (Nos.
15-1890, 15-1891); Br. of Washington Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Supp. of Defs.-
Appellants, Urging Reversal at 1-2, United States v. Decoster, 828 F.3d 626 (8th Cir. 2016) (Nos. 15-
1890, 15-1891); Br. for Amici Curiae Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America and
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America in Supp. of Appellants and Urging Reversal at
3, United States v. Decoster, 828 F.3d 626 (8th Cir. 2016) (Nos. 15-1890, 15-1891).
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[sic] offense without his or her knowledge is incompatible with our
established principles of fairness and justice."98 So the idea of expanding
the accountability of corporate officers through strict liability offenses
appears to be anathema to corporate America-and its lobbyists, no doubt.
Legislation on criminal justice reform in Congress includes a bill that
would adopt a "[d]efault state of mind" requiring proof of knowledge for
any criminal prosecution under a statute for which "no state of mind is
required" by the text of the provision.99 In addition, the bill would require
that, "if the offense consists of conduct that a reasonable person in the same
or similar circumstances would not know, or would not have reason to
believe, was unlawful, the Government must prove that the defendant
knew, or had reason to believe, the conduct was unlawful."'00 This sounds
like the kindergarten excuse that "everybody else was doing it" when a
child is caught breaking the rules. As long as it looked like the conduct fell
within some reasonable business norm, then the person could not be
convicted unless it was shown that they knew their actions violated the law,
but went ahead otherwise. This would be even better than a good faith
defense because the burden would be on the prosecution to prove the most
onerous subjective state of mind in the law-that one is consciously
violating a known legal duty-that is normally reserved for crimes
involving complex legal requirements, like tax evasion. Executives will
have a field day claiming that they did not understand the law or never
really wanted to violate it.
The proffered reason why this type of law is necessary is to keep
innocent people from being swept up in a regulatory crackdown for actions
that they were unaware violated the law. For example, Senator Orin Hatch
told the Senate, "Without adequate mens rea protections-that is, without
the requirement that a person know his conduct was wrong, or unlawful-
everyday citizens can be held criminally liable for conduct that no
reasonable person would know was wrong. This is not only unfair; it is
immoral."'0 ' So pity the poor corporate executive who believed he or she
was not doing anything wrong, only wanting to help the company, but now
faces charges.
98. Br. for Amici Curiae the National Association of Manufacturers and the CATO Institute
Supporting Appellants and Reversal at 12, United States v. DeCoster, 828 F.3d 626 (8th Cir. 2016)
(Nos. 15-1890, 15-1891).
99. Criminal Code Improvement Act of2015, H.R. 4002, 114th Cong. § 11 (2d Sess. 2015).
100. Id.
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Criminal prosecutions of corporate officers have not happened in the
last few years anyway, and it is getting harder to pursue those cases. Add in
a defense that rewards going along with the crowd while maintaining at
least plausible ignorance of exactly what the law requires, and there will be
no criminal consequences for individuals for their role in corporate
misconduct.
CONCLUSION
The Justice Department often finds itself in a "damned if you do,
damned if you don't" position. Any prosecution that results in a "not
guilty" verdict is a damaging loss, while failing to pursue cases that have a
low chance of success means that prosecutors have not been aggressive
enough. That job is not getting any easier, because the chances of pursuing
cases against individuals inside large corporate organizations appear to be
even harder to achieve. The problem may be more attributable to
overpromising on the pursuit of individuals. This is likely to result in
underdelivering by bringing few successful cases, not that there is some
devious plan to give executives a pass. The net result will be the same, as
few individual prosecutions are likely to occur. Having made the
prosecution of those inside the corporation a particular focus of its
investigations, the Justice Department may have doomed itself to failure
because it cannot reasonably hope to live up to the expectations it created.
Whether bringing fewer cases against individuals involved in corporate
misconduct is a good or bad thing is a very different question. It may well
be that decisions like Weimert, Litvak, and O'Donnell v. Countrywide
reflect the trend to limit the use of criminal laws as tools to deter violations
by corporations. Business organizations are subject to a number of
regulatory requirements. It is arguable that policing their conduct can be
done better, or at least more expeditiously, through the administrative
process and in civil enforcement actions than in a criminal prosecution.
Holding individuals in an organization accountable when there are
potentially numerous actors who had a hand in the misconduct reeks of
identifying a scapegoat. Whether or not criminal prosecution is the better
way to pursue wrongdoing, prosecuting individuals is unlikely to result
from the announced change in how a corporation can cooperate with the
Department of Justice.
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